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Neighborhood Watch: The Negation of Rights Caused
by the Notice Requirement in Copyright Enforcement
Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
Colin Folawn*
Unlike traditional media that limit and pre-censor the content of
information disseminated to the public, the Internet could be-
come the digital equivalent of the classic agora where public de-
bate, artistic creativity, and cultural diversity coexist with com-
mercial transactions. Realization of that possibility depends on
our ability to strike an equitable balance between the public in-
terest in access to works and rightholders' ability to profit from
their investments in producing such works. -Deborah Tussey1
I. INTRODUCTION
This Comment discusses the problems inherent in the notice re-
quirement' of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA),3
which requires copyright holders to notify Internet Service Providers
(ISPs) before they are required to remove infringing material from a
server or investigate a copyright infringement incident. Although
some copyright holders4 have sufficient resources to detect infringe-
ment and enforce their rights through the DMCA, the structure of the
notice requirement represents a heavy burden to stakeholders like in-
dependent copyright holders. Because they are unable to effectively
* J.D. summa cum laude, Seattle University School of Law, 2003; B.M., Willamette University,
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1. Deborah Tussey, From Fan Sites to Filesharing: Personal Use in Cyberspace, 35 GA. L.
REV. 1129, 1132 (2001).
2. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (1998).
3. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. § 512, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112
Stat. 2860 (1998).
4. For example, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) is a large organi-
zation that assists and represents most major recording companies in lobbying, litigation, and
public relations efforts relating to copyright infringement.
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enforce copyrights, independent copyright holders experience a nega-
tion of rights.
Additionally, the substantial compliance standard is confusing
because the courts do not seem to understand how to balance the
competing interests as Congress intended. As will be discussed later,
one recent memorandum opinion offers hope for sorting out these in-
terests properly.' To recalibrate the balance of these competing inter-
ests, Congress should consider the metaphor of a neighborhood in
regulating Internet copyrights.
The Neighborhood Watch Program was developed by the Na-
tional Crime Prevention Council (NCPC) to detect and prevent crime,
but it was also meant to strengthen communities by empowering resi-
dents to take active roles in protecting themselves.6 After the Septem-
ber 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the Program has taken on a new rele-
vance, and the NCPC is addressing the epidemic of fear by expanding
the number of participating neighborhood groups.' Strangely enough,
the Internet,8 a neighborhood of its own,9 does not have a cognate to
the Neighborhood Watch Program, even though an epidemic of its
own, in the form of copyright infringement ° and other criminal activ-
ity," has been taking place for years. Although the DMCA 12 was a
S. See infra, Part IV (B), discussion of In re Verizon Internet Services, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d
24 (D.D.C. 2003).
6. National Crime Prevention Council, Neighborhood Watch Gets Residents Prepared, avail-
able at http://www.ncpc.org/ncpc/ncpc/?pg= 5882-3200-5232-6106 (last visited Mar. 1, 2003).
7. Id.
8. Initially spawned as a military communications tool known as DARPANet (Defense
Advanced Research Project Agency Network), the first Internet was a distributed networking
model, which enabled communication between any two connected points, even in the event of a
nuclear attack. See A Bit of Internet History, available at http://www.firstbite.co.nz/training
/intro/history.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2002) (stating that "The history of the Internet began
with the RAND group in 1966. Paul Baran was commissioned by the US Air Force to do a
study on how it could maintain its command and control over its missiles and bombers, after a
nuclear attack. Baran's finished document described several ways to accomplish this task. What
he finally proposed was a packet switched network. This network would have no central hub,
and no central control centre. Instead it would have lines linking various places together. Pack-
ets would be forwarded from place to place until they arrived at the proper destination.").
9. See generally, Julian Dibbell, A Rape in Cyberspace: How an Evil Clown, a Haitian Trick-
ster Spirit, Two Wizards, and a Cast of Dozens Turned a Database into a Society, 1994 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 471 (1994), reprinted in MARK STEFIK, INTERNET DREAMS 293 (MIT Press
1997); Pavel Curtis, Mudding: Social Phenomena in Text-Based Virtual Realities, in MARK
STEFIK, INTERNET DREAMS 265 (MIT Press 1997).
10. See Charles C. Mann, The Year the Music Dies, available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/ll.02/dirge.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2003); see also
Todd Woody, The Race to Kill Kazaa, available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive
/11.02/kazaa.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2003).
11. See, e.g., Michelle Delio, Why Worm Writers Stay Free, available at
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,49313,00.html (Dec. 27, 2001); Declan McCul-
lagh & Ryan Sager, FBI Blasts Reluctant Hackees, available at http://www.wired.com/news/
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step in the right direction (albeit initiated by private interests), 13 it
failed to adequately address the concerns of independent copyright
holders,'4 who are unable to maintain their rights. Equally concerning
is the difference of opinion among the courts in determining how strict
compliance with the notice requirement should be.'"
At first glance, the notice requirement 6 of the DMCA seems to
correctly place the burden on the copyright holders because, as owners
or authors of the work, they are the beneficiaries of copyright protec-
tion, and they are best able to identify instances of infringement.
However, after examining the nature of modern file sharing software
and recent case law, it becomes clear that the resources required to
find infringement on the Internet and to create this notice are overly
burdensome to independent copyright holders.
The problem of unauthorized file sharing via the Internet is seen
clearly in the realm of digital music.'7 The advent of file compression
politics/0,1283,43451,00.html (May 1, 2001); Michelle Delio, Brit Cops Tackle E-Thievery,
available at http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,43171,00.html (Apr. 19, 2001); Ka-
tie Dean, Who Should Fight Cybercrime?, available at http://www.wired.com/news/politics
/0,1283,36566,00.html (Jun. 1, 2000); Polly Sprenger, US Senate Cracked Again, available at
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,20180,00.html (Jun. 11, 1999); Douglas Thomas,
How Much Damage Did Mitnick Do?, available at http://www.wired.com/news/politics
/0,1283,19488,00.html (May 5, 1999); Polly Sprenger, AOL Fraud Touches West Virginia, avail-
able at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,18436,00.html (Mar. 13, 1999); Claudia
Graziano, Tracking Global Cybercrime, available at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/
0,1283,15222,00.html (Sep. 25, 1998); Michelle Delio, MS Refocuses on Software Pirates, avail-
able at http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,49856,00.html (last visited Feb. 16,
2002); Declan McCullagh, Cybercrime Bill Ups the Ante, available at http://www.wired.com
/news/politics/0,1283,50363,00.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2002).
12. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. § 512, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112
Stat. 2860 (1998).
13. JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 130 (2001).
The Clinton administration had committed itself to a general game plan in connection
with all Internet regulation that required it to identify what needed to be done to fa-
cilitate electronic commerce, to do that, and to do as little as possible except for that.
After the bruising copyright fight in the last Congress, it wanted to satisfy the Holly-
wood and Silicon Valley communities but did not want to have to expend significant
political capital.
Id. (emphasis added).
14. This Comment is concerned with copyright holders who are not affiliated with record
companies that are represented by the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), be-
cause such artists do not likely have the resources to investigate, detect, and prevent copyright
infringement of their works. Some independent copyright holders may allow the free and open
sharing of their works in order to increase the works' popularity and value, but this Comment
focuses on those copyright holders who may not choose to do this.
15. As the later analysis indicates, this not only requires an inquiry into what information is
necessary for the ISP to locate the instance of infringement, but also an examination of the com-
peting interests implicated by the notice requirement mechanism.
16. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (1998).
17. Jane Irene Kelly, In Depth-The Download Dilemma, available at
http://www.newmedia.com/nm-ns.asp?articlelD=2212 (last visited Nov. 10, 2001) (quoting
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technology," combined with the increasing popularity of broadband
Internet service,19 enables large amounts of copyrighted content to be
shared with the world quickly, without the permission of the copyright
holder and in violation of their copyrights. With the creation of online
services like Napster,2 ° the problem of music piracy grew large enough
to receive the significant attention of the Recording Industry Associa-
tion of America (RIAA), because millions of Internet users illegally
shared millions of files on a daily basis. 2' Although the Napster net-
work no longer functions as it once did, copyright infringement con-
tinues through peer-to-peer (P2P) technology, and the problem re-
22mains. Without an adequate enforcement model, the neighborhood
Russell J. Frackman, Esq., in his opening argument in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239
F. 3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001), "14,000 recordings are downloaded [per] minute using the Napster
system."); see, e.g., RIAA, RIAA/Anti -Piracy Statistics, available at http://www.riaa.com/
Protect-Campaign-6.cfm (last visited Nov. 10, 2001) (stating that 2.8 million illegal recordable
compact discs (CD-Rs) were seized in 2001, reflecting a 175% increase from CD-Rs seized in
2000).
18. WinZipcL-What is a Zip File Anyhow?, available at http://www.winzip.com/
aboutzip.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2002) ("Usually the files 'archived' in a Zip are compressed to
save space. Zip files make it easy to group files and make transporting and copying these files
faster.").
19. Federal Communications Commission, Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications
Capability: Second Report, (Aug. 2000), available at http://ftp.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common
_Carrier/Orders/2000/fccOO290.pdf (reporting that, as of Dec. 31, 1999, there were approxi-
mately 2.8 million subscribers to advanced or high-speed Internet access, which is defined as 200
kilobits per second or higher).
20. A&M Records, 239 F.3d at 1013-1016; see also Dan Labriola & David English, Most
Innovative Software: Napster, available at http://www.zdnet.com/products/stories/reviews
/0,4161,2662839,00.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2001).
21. See Labriola & English, supra note 20.
22. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 243 F.Supp. 2d 1073, 1081
(C.D. Cal. 2003). The court described the peer-to-peer file sharing system clearly:
[T]he "Kazaa system" operates in a manner conceptually analogous to the Napster
system .... [The Kazaa Media Desktop (KMD)] enables Internet users to search for
and exchange digital media with other users .... Once installed, each KMD user may
elect to "share" certain files located on the user's computer, including, for instance,
music files, video files, software applications, e-books, and text files. When launched
on a user's computer, KMD automatically connects to the FastTrack peer-to-peer
network, and makes any shared files available for transfer to any other user's com-
puter.
Once connected to the FastTrack network, the KMD software provides a range of
means through which a user may search through this pool of shared files. For in-
stance, a user can select to search only among audio files, and then enter a keyword ti-
tle or artist search. Once a search commences, the KMD software displays a list (or
partial list) of users who are currently sharing files that match the search criteria,
including data such as the estimated time required to transfer each file. The user may
then click on a specific listing to initiate a direct transfer from the source computer to
the requesting user's computer. When the transfer is complete, the requesting user
and source user have identical copies of the file, and the requesting user may also start
sharing the file with others.
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of the Internet will continue to be plagued by criminal copyright in-
fringement.
Additionally, the DMCA was the result of a legislative process
that pandered to private interest groups like the RIAA and the ISP in-
dustry, rather than considering the rights of individual copyright
holders. 23 This is evidenced throughout copyright law, where certain
forms of expression are arbitrarily given protection, and others are ex-
cluded. For example, there is no rational reason that the Copyright
Act of 1976 needed to protect an exclusive right to public performance
for digital audio transmission, but not digital video transmission.24
One of the resulting problems was the inequitable burden placed upon
independent copyright holders to protect their copyrights. Under the
DMCA, ISPs and Online Service Providers (OSPs) have no duty to
search for infringing activities until they receive notification from the
copyright holder or her designee. 2' Because these important consid-
erations seem to have been neglected in the DMCA, this Comment
proposes that the initial burden of locating infringement of copy-
righted music over the Internet26 should be shared between independ-
ent copyright holders and ISPs. 27 Independent copyright holders qua
enforcing authorities are ill-equipped to meet the challenge of investi-
gating unauthorized file sharing on the Internet. Instead, the DMCA
should have been structured as to encourage cooperation among the
various Internet stakeholders, not unlike the well-known Neighbor-
hood Watch Program. 2' Finally, this Comment proposes that the
government should not play a monitoring role, because it is institu-
tionally incompetent to monitor the entirety of the Internet, and such
an effort would likely be viewed as an unacceptable violation of con-
sumer privacy.
The Proposal in this Comment may be more applicable to OSPs
than it is to ISPs. For the purposes of the DMCA and the Proposal,
the most important distinction is in the function they provide to
Id. See also In re Verizon Internet Services, Inc., 240 F.Supp 2d. 24, 35 (D.D.C. 2003) (stating
that "the largest opportunity for copyright theft is through peer-to-peer ('P2P') software").
23. LITMAN, supra note 13, at 144-145.
24. 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2000).
25. Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i)-(vi); Joseph P. Zammit, Website Liability: Risks and Costs of Com-
pliance, 611 PLI/PAT 815, 835 (2000).
26. This Comment refers to the World Wide Web (WWVW), File Transfer Protocol
(FTP), Usenet and other various Internet protocols, but it focuses on peer-to-peer file (P2P)
sharing, arguably the most popular conduit for copyright infringement.
27. This Comment focuses on OSPs more than ISPs. This is appropriate because OSPs
arguably derive a benefit from all consumer activity on their domains (including unauthorized
file sharing), whereas an ISP may derive a lesser benefit as is discussed infra, Part V.
28. See National Crime Prevention Council, Effective Strategy: Neighborhood Watch, avail-
able at http://128.121.17.146/ncpc/ncpc/?pg=2088-9644 (last visited June 3, 2003).
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Internet users and their role in maintaining the Internet. The DMCA
defines a service provider, for the purposes of subsection (a), as "an
entity offering the transmission, routing, or providing connections for
digital online communications, between or among points specified by
a user, of material of the user's choosing, without modification to the
content of the material as sent or received. ' 29 Simply put, ISPs pro-
vide consumers with service in the form of access to a network. The
DMCA provides a second definition of service provider, applicable to
all other subsections: "[A] provider of online services or network ac-
cess, or the operator of facilities therefor, and includes an entity de-
scribed in subparagraph (A)."3 At a minimum, OSPs do not supply
access to the Internet itself, but they create services that can be
reached through a pre-existing Internet connection. At the most,
OSPs provide both online services and Internet access. Businesses
that exist on the Internet add value because they create spaces of
communication or commerce on the Internet, but they are generally
much smaller in scope than ISPs. Nicholas Negroponte might refer to
this distinction as the difference between the selling of access and the
selling of bits themselves.31
Part II of this Comment explains why the DMCA was created,
beginning with a brief discussion of modern copyright justifications.
Part III lays out the mechanics of the notice requirement and the safe
harbor protection for ISPs. Part IV focuses on inconsistencies among
the courts and the enforcement dilemma posed by the DMCA. Part V
proposes a different standard for the initial notice, encouraging ISPs to
work cooperatively with independent copyright holders. This part in-
cludes a preview of services and software that exist and that are being
developed to ease the burden of finding and managing digital content.
Finally, Part VI analyzes the benefits and burdens created by the Pro-
posal and addresses possible counterarguments that would likely be
posed by the various stakeholders, and Part VII presents concluding
remarks.
II. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF THE DMCA
A. Copyright Law and the Internet
The law surrounding copyright infringement applies to activity
within the Internet neighborhood because copyright does not depend
on the environment in which a work exists. Intellectual property,
29. 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(A) (1998).
30. Id. § 512(k)(1)(B).
31. NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL 51-58,62-67 (1996).
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some of which is protected by copyright law, is often referred to as a
"bundle of exclusive rights. ' '32 For copyright, the bundle includes ex-
clusive rights to reproduce the work,33 to distribute copies of the
work,34 to create derivative works, 3' and to perform or publicly display
the work.36 While the bundle of rights may change depending on the
nature or character of the owned subject, these rights would not neces-
sarily change simply because the work can be disseminated over a
network.37 After all, references to works in the Copyright Act of 1976
focus on the creation and type of work, not on how it is physically em-
bodied.38 Because copyright protection does not change simply be-
cause of the medium of a given work, such rights apply similarly in the
real world and in cyberspace. Some commentators have correctly
made the Internet seem more similar to the real world than it is
unique.
In the beginning of Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, Professor
Lawrence Lessig aptly analogizes the post-Communist Russia of 1989
to the Internet of 1995.39 Americans pressured those in Eastern and
Central Europe to adopt constitutionalism, but such commands scared
the former communists into a remarkably staunch anti-governmental
posture.g Instead, a libertarian sensibility took over, allowing the
markets and nongovernmental organizations to determine the course
of the new country.4' Unfortunately, this choice failed to protect
against the kind of control the former communists feared. Power was
transferred from governmental organizations to private interests like
the Russian mafia.42 Therefore, although systems of control were
32. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 220 (1990).
33. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2000).
34. Id. § 106(3).
35. Id. § 106(2).
36. Id. § 106(4)-(5).
37. Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the "Information Superhighway": Authors, Exploiters,
and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1466, 1475 (1995).
38. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) ('Audiovisual works' are works that consist of a series of re-
lated images which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines, or devices such
as projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if any, re-
gardless of the nature of the material objects, such as films or tapes, in which the works are em-
bodied."). A work is protected under the Copyright Act of 1976 if it is an "original work of au-
thorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression." 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000). Advances in
Internet technology have made the sharing of digital works very easy, and European countries
have allowed for a private copying exception. Ginsburg, supra note 37, at 1477. However, the
United States courts have refused such a rule. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d
1004, 1013-1016 (9th Cir. 2001).
39. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 4 (1999).
40. Id. at 3.
41. Id. at 3-4.
42. Id. at 4.
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changed by the decision not to create new laws and rules, such change
failed to achieve the intended freedom.43
The consumer Internet is similar to post-Communist Europe be-
cause of the haphazard manner in which it was created. Not unlike
the fall of Communism, the Internet arrived like an alarm call, and
anti-governmental sentiment was present in both instances.44 Profes-
sor Lessig stresses that Eastern Europe's problem should be a warning
to those concerned with the future of the Internet, because without a
constitutional build of rules and values for the Internet, power will re-
side solely with those who program the code of the Internet.4' Finally,
Professor Lessig voices this warning as an imperative, because there is
"every reason to believe that cyberspace, left to itself .... will become
a perfect tool of control .... The invisible hand, through commerce,
is constructing an architecture... that makes possible highly efficient
regulation."46 Clearly, the application of law to the Internet neighbor-
hood is not only possible, but also necessary in order to further the
public good and prevent control by purely private entities. Congress
likely saw this same need when it created the DMCA. More con-
cretely, the role of copyright law is just as important to the real world
as it is to the Internet.
Professor Jane C. Ginsburg47 argued that copyright law should
be applied regardless of whether the work exists in a digital or analog
medium and regardless of its ability to be disseminated across a dis-
tributed network.48 In other words, the package should not dictate the
rights in the content. In this regard, the DMCA did not dilute copy-
rights in digital works. Therefore, although Professor Lessig might
say that the law of code, which influences Internet user behavior on an
organic level, is stronger than a law exterior to code, where the behav-
ioral mandate is external to the user experience, both Professors Lessig
and Ginsburg would likely agree that there is nothing about the Inter-
net that necessarily rejects our conceptions of law in society. The
same justifications and conceptual framework of rights, duties, pow-
ers, and liabilities apply-the Internet does not evade this time-tested
logic; only its application differs. Moreover, the existence of the
DMCA is strong evidence that Congress is not yet willing to let copy-
right evanesce. However, before delving into the structure of the
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 5.
46. Id. at 5-6.
47. Ginsburg, supra note 37, at 1466.
48. Id. at 1467.
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DMCA, it is important to examine the modern justifications of copy-
right protection.
B. Copyright Justifications
The U.S. Constitution provides that Congress has the power
"[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries."49 Modern copyright law exists
to maintain the delicate balance between incentives for creators and
public access to their works."0 Although the importance of the reward
is a secondary concern to that of society's benefit," the currently
popular theoretical justification for copyright law is that it secures a
monetary incentive for creators to continue to create, thereby enrich-
ing the public when the work is necessarily shared with the world. 2
To protect these rights, a copyright holder may bring an action for in-
junctive relief" or damages 4 for activity that infringes5 the bundle of
exclusive rights. However, the Copyright Act of 1976 did not con-
template the Internet, and additional legislation was needed.
C. Enter the DMCA
The DMCA was created to modernize traditional copyright law
for the rapidly evolving Internet age. 6  Unlike copyright law, 7 the
49. U.S. CONST. art I., § 8, cl. 8.
50. Tussey, supra note 1, at 1131-32.
51. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123,127 (1932).
52. See generally Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105
(1990) (discussing these principles in the context of the fair use doctrine); see also Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (stating that "[Copyright law]
is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors.., by the provision of a special reward,
and to allow public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive
control has expired.").
53. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2000).
54. Id. § 504.
55. Id.
56. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. § 512, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112
Stat. 2860 (1998); see, e.g., Amy P. Bunk, Validity, Construction and Application of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, 2001 A.L.R. Fed 2, 1 (2002) (unpublished annotation).
57. David A. Petteys, The Freedom to Link?: The Digital Millennium Copyright Act Impli-
cates the First Amendment in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
287,291-92 (2001):
A copyright infringement suit was prosecuted simply by locating the producer of cop-
ies and obtaining an injunction to prevent further copying or by seizing his printing
press. Not only was the infringer relatively static, but the cost of equipment pre-
sented a significant barrier of entry to the illicit trade of book pirating. Technology
has radically altered the paradigm. The means of copying, a computer, is readily ob-
tainable and allows the digital pirate to make near-perfect copies of digital audio and
Seattle University Law Review
DMCA contemplates the existence of the Internet, digital copying,
and the liability of ISPs. Proponents of the DMCA said that it was
"designed to facilitate the robust development and worldwide expan-
sion of electronic commerce, communications, research, development,
and education." 8 Among other aspects, the DMCA focuses on tech-
nological means of copyright infringement by outlawing the circum-
vention of copyright protection schemes, 9 the manufacture of tech-
nology for circumvention purposes, g° and the dissemination of such
technology.6' In addition, Congress was careful not to change the ba-
sic structure of rights, remedies, and defenses within traditional copy-
right law.62 Some commentators felt the DMCA was "exactly what
the copyright law needed to maintain its relevance in today's Internet
world."63 Arguably, the DMCA maintained the ability for the Inter-
net to evolve as unfettered as legally possible64 while attempting to en-
sure that content creators still received incentives to create. The im-
portance of the DMCA is better understood after briefly examining
the reality of the Internet before its enactment.
The DMCA was necessary in order to solve the problem posed
by the emergence of the consumer Internet. When compression and
identification schemes were diverse,65 the global sharing of digital
works was splintered into discrete communities.66 However, the MP3
file format (a colloquial abbreviation for Motion Picture Experts'
Group Layer-3) soon emerged as a standard, 67 enabling any Internet
user with a standard dial-up modem to share commercial music with-
out having to pay for it.68 Suddenly, digital entertainment content, in-
cluding music, could be disseminated to the world instantaneously.69
video works at very little cost .... Moreover, the Internet allows a copyright infringer
to distribute perfect copies around the world instantaneously and anonymously.
Id.
58. S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 1 (1998).
59. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A)-(D) (1998).
60. Id. § 1201(a)(2).
61. Id. § 1201(b)(1)(A)-(C).
62. Id. § 1201(c).
63. Christian C.M. Beams, The Copyright Dilemma Involving Online Service Providers:
Problem Solved... for Now, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 823, 825 (1999).
64. Namely, the DMCA allowed the evolution of the Internet to continue without abrogat-
ing other laws.
65. See generally, Farhad Manjoo, Napster Sharers Sharing Less, available at http://www.
wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,42452,00.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2002).
66. Brad King, File Tracker May Go Too Far, available at http://www.wired.com
/news/mp3/0,1285,43714,00.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2002).
67. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001).
68. Id.
69. Brad King, File Trading Instantly Is Easier, available at http://www.wired.com/news
/mp3/0,1285,48071,00.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2002).
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The average Internet user was endowed with worldwide distribution
power equal or superior to that of the great publishing houses of the
twentieth century, with one added bonus: virtual anonymity." This
anonymity was created partially because of the distributive nature of
the Internet, 71 but more closely, it was unclear who was responsible for
investigating and enforcing copyright law on the Internet. n Obvi-
ously, this created an entirely new problem for Congress: patching an
old law to fit the unique digital environment of cyberspace. 3 The
DMCA was an answer, albeit somewhat stilted and slow, to a real
problem. One aspect of the DMCA, the notice requirement, appears
innocuous and even beneficial, but it creates a caste system, negating
the rights of independent copyright holders. Part III discusses the
mechanics of the notice requirement.
III. THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT AND THE SAFE HARBORS
A. The Notice Requirement74
The notice requirement promulgated under the DMCA is un-
duly burdensome to independent copyright holders because they alone
carry the initial burden of discovering unauthorized file sharing, un-
aided by any service providers. In the unlikely circumstance that a
copyright holder is able to discover an incident of infringement, she
must then satisfy the notice requirement in order to prompt the ISP to
take action. This section discusses the mechanics of the notice re-
quirement as promulgated under the DMCA.
An ISP is notified of infringement under the DMCA only if such
notice is a written communication that substantially includes the fol-
lowing factors: (1) a signature (physical or electronic) of the copyright
70. Brad King, ISPs Face Down DMCA, available at http://www.wired.com/news
/technology/0,1282,40816,00.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2002).
71. King, supra note 69.
72. Id.
73. LITMAN, supra note 13, at 111.
The threat and promise of networked digital technology is that every individual with
access to a computer will be able to perform the twenty-first-century equivalent of
printing, reprinting, publishing, and vending. If the vast majority of them do not
comply with the copyright law, then the copyright law is in danger of becoming ir-
relevant.
Id.
74. For a brief discussion of the substantial compliance problem, focusing on the ALS Scan
case, see Pearson Liddell, Jr. & William D. Eshee, Jr., Substantial Notice under the Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act, 8 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 379 (2002); for a more complete analysis of
ALS Scan, see Laura Rybka, ALS Scan, Inc. v. Remarq Communities, Inc.: Notice and ISPs'
Liability for Third Party Copyright Infringement, 11 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y
479 (2001).
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owner or his authorized agent;7" (2) identification of the copyrighted
work that is being infringed;76 (3) identification of the material that is
being infringed;77 (4) information that is reasonably sufficient to allow
the ISP to contact the complaining party;78 (5) a statement that the
copyright holder has a good faith belief that the use or activity is not
authorized by law; 79 and (6) a statement that the notification is accu-
rate and that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of
the copyright holder under penalty of perjury. 0
If the complaining party fulfills factors (2), (3), and (4), then fac-
tor (1) is required only when the ISP promptly makes an attempt to
contact the notifier in order to assist in the receipt of the required in-
formation."' Notification of infringement does not affect analysis as to
whether the ISP had actual or constructive knowledge of infringe-
ment. 2 This means that, without more, notice of infringement alone
will not subject an ISP to liability simply because of the information in
the notice. An ISP is also free from liability for infringement even if it
provides access to infringing material through an automated search
engine, provided that there is no actual or constructive knowledge that
the material or activity is infringing." Clearly, it is only after the
copyright holder specifically pinpoints the infringing activity that an
ISP is under a duty to act.
Although one might argue that this is an appropriate scenario be-
cause the copyright holder is in the best position to identify infringe-
ment, this process is cumbersome and, in most instances, is bound to
fail because ISPs are diverse in the services they offer and the proto-
cols they use." The courts already appear to be confused as to
whether every factor must be present or if a factor-based analysis
should apply." At bottom, this inconsistency reflects confusion as to
the purposes of the DMCA and how the competing interests of the
ISP industry and copyright holders should be balanced. As will be
discussed in Part IV, one court has identified these competing inter-
75. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i) (1998).
76. Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(ii).
77. Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii).
78. Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iv).
79. Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v).
80. Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(vi).
81. Id. § 512(c)(3)(B)(i).
82. Id. § 512(c)(3)(B)(ii).
83. Id. § 512(d)(1)(A)-(C).
84. See, e.g., Hendrickson v. eBay, 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (discussing
eBay auction numbers); see also A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.
2001) (discussing the proprietary Napster network).
85. Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1089 (stating that "[T]he notification must include
'substantially' the.. .six elements." (emphasis added)).
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ests and characterized the limited liability as an exchange for the bur-
den of assisting with copyright enforcement, but first an understand-
ing of the safe harbor provision is necessary.
B. The Safe Harbors86
Put simply, ISPs are those who provide "online services or net-
work access," or those who operate "facilities therefor.""7 Under the
DMCA, ISPs enjoy large, sweeping immunity from copyright liability
including monetary," injunctive,89 and equitable relief,9" provided that
the ISP does not initiate the transmission of infringing material, 91 se-
lect the material, 92 select the recipients of the material (unless the proc-
ess was automated), 93 maintain a copy on the network for longer than
would be ordinarily necessary for the connection,94 or modify the ma-
terial.9" Essentially, if the infringing material exists on the network at
the sole direction of users, and the ISP has no actual or constructive
knowledge of the infringement, the ISP will be immune from liabil-
ity.96 ISPs, therefore, are Internet neighbors who have a disincentive
to look for copyright infringement. This is referred to as a safe harbor
within which the ISP is allowed to operate freely. 97 However, this safe
harbor is not without its limits.
If the ISP receives a direct financial benefit from the infringe-
ment, or if it fails to remove or disable access to the infringing mate-
rial, then the ISP loses its immunity from liability." If the ISP actu-
ally ends up removing the material from a user's account or domain,
the ISP is immune from liability, provided that it takes reasonable
86. For a more complete discussion of the safe harbor provisions, see Raphael A. Gutierrez,
Save the Slip for the Service Providers: Courts Should Not Give Short Shrift to the Safe Harbors of
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 907 (2002); for a robust analysis on how
the safe harbor provisions apply to P2P technology, see Giovanna Fessenden, Peer-to-Peer Tech-
nology: Analysis of Contributory Infringement and Fair Use, 42 IDEA 391 (2002); see also Heidi
Pearlman Salon, Liability Immunity for Service Providers-How Is It Working?, 6.1 J. TECH. L. &
POL'Y 1 (2000), at http://grove.ufl.edu/-techlaw/vol6/Pearlman.html (last visited May 4,
2003).
87. 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B).






94. Id. § 512(a)(1)-(5).
95. Id.
96. Id. § 512(c).
97. Id.
98. Id. § 512(d)(2)-(3).
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steps to notify the user about the takedown,99 gives counter notice to
the copyright holder should the ISP replace the material in question,
and replaces the material within fourteen days following receipt of the
counter notice. 00
Although safe harbor provisions appear on their face to be bene-
ficial to the growth of the Internet, these provisions, when combined
with a strict read of the notice requirements, encourage ISPs to sit idly
by until a copyright holder pinpoints the exact location of an infring-
ing activity and gives specific and particular notice to the ISP.10 1 Even
when a copyright holder is able to determine with specificity where
such activity is taking place, the artist is often required to do exhaus-
tive investigation in order prompt the ISP to remove the infringing
link, file, or directory. 1°2 This wait-and-see ISP posture effectively ne-
gates the rights provided by copyright law. Having briefly discussed
the notice requirement and safe harbor provisions of the DMCA, it is
helpful to examine recent case law determining what constitutes sub-
stantial compliance. Although the case law on this aspect of the
DMCA is sparse, the courts are applying this standard inconsistently.
IV. SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE: INCONSISTENCIES IN RECENT
CASE LAW
A. The "Factors as Elements" Approach
The DMCA requires merely substantial compliance of its notice
requirement, but the United States District Court for the Central Dis-
trict of California failed to give this allowance adequate consideration.
In Hendrickson v. eBay,"'0 the court held that plaintiffs notification of
infringement to online service provider eBay did not substantially
comply with the factors necessary for effective notice listed in 17
U.S.C. section 512(c)(3). °4 In addition to illustrating the problem
with allowing for substantial compliance, this case demonstrates the
site-specific informational burden copyright holders face once in-
fringement is discovered. Before giving its inappropriately elemental
analysis, the court implied that the plaintiff failed to give the notice in
writing.' However, in doing so, the court failed to discern the dis-
tinction Congress allowed for when it required a "physical or elec-
99. Id. § 512(g)(1)-( 2 ).
100. Id.
101. King, supra note 70.
102. See, e.g., Hendrickson v. eBay, 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (C.D. Cal., 2001).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1092.
105. Id. at 1089.
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tronic signature. '"106 This strict interpretation of the notice require-
ment continued throughout the opinion.
First, the court stated that plaintiff failed to include a statement
indicating a good faith belief that the information in the complaint was
accurate." 7 Although this would generally seem to be a low threshold
requirement (such a statement could likely be inferred from the con-
tent, tone, and ultimate goal of the communication), the court was
likely correct with regard to the plaintiffs original e-mail message."'
After all, plaintiffs cursory five-line message appeared suspect be-
cause it requested "any and ALL information ... on these criminals,"
rather than the simple request that eBay initiate a "takedown" on the
allegedly infringing activity." 9
Second, the court discussed the lack of an "under penalty of per-
jury" boilerplate on the written notification."' Finally, the court
noted the absence of eBay identification numbers on plaintiffs no-
tice."' On the face of the opinion, the court appeared to place the
greatest weight on this final aspect. The court reasoned that while the
plaintiff did identify some auction numbers in a discovery response,
and this pre-dated the filing of the complaint,"' the lack of a statement
as to a good faith belief that the items were pirated and that the allega-
tions were accurate made the notice invalid."' Interestingly enough,
the court interpreted 17 U.S.C. section 512(c)(3)(A)(iii) to mean that
the plaintiff had to include the specific auction numbers because this
would show the OSP the specific location of the alleged infringement.
This is specious reasoning because, although such information would
significantly reduce eBay's burden of removing the auction listings, it
effectively adds an unnecessary legal burden to the copyright holder's
DMCA task list-unnecessary because the auction could still be lo-
cated without the individual identification numbers. While the inclu-
sion of such numbers would have helped eBay in locating the auction,
the notice requirement does not require that the copyright holder give
all information that could be helpful to the ISP-only information that
identifies the material being infringed." 4 If other courts follow Hen-
drickson, the copyright holder must not only run his own investigation
throughout the entirety of the Internet, but now he must also familiar-
106. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i).
107. Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. at 1089-90.
108. Id. at 1091.
109. Id. at 1091 n.l (emphasis in original).
110. Id. at 1089.
111. Id. at 1090-92.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1089-90.
114. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii).
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ize himself with the eccentricities of each Web service or software cli-
ent through which infringing activity takes place. Taken together with
the Hendrickson opinion, the lack of litigation involving online copy-
right infringement is evidence that the burden of supplying notice is
simply too great for independent artists who wish to reduce infringe-
ment of their copyrights." 5
Inexplicably, the Hendrickson court seemed to disagree with the
Fourth Circuit decision, ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Inc., which cor-
rectly noted that "the DMCA ... allows notice by means that com-
port with the prescribed format only 'substantially,' rather than per-
fectly.""' 6  In ALS Scan, the copyright holder provided substantial
notice even though there was no representative list of the infringed
works (photographs). Instead, ALS Scan identified the addresses of
the two Usenet newsgroups were defined by ALS Scan's name, as-
serted that virtually all of the images were ALS Scan's copyrighted
material, referred the defendant to two Web addresses where the de-
fendant could find pictures of the ALS Scan models and obtain copy-
right information, and noted that each photograph was marked with
ALS Scan's name and copyright symbol." 7  Arguably, Hendrickson
represents a departure from the reasoning in ALS Scan, because al-
though each plaintiff provided locating information (Hendrickson
gave specific user information, while ALS Scan merely gave the Use-
net newsgroup address-a far less specific location, given that some of
the photographs were not owned by ALS Scan), Mr. Hendrickson
failed and ALS Scan, Inc. succeeded.
ALS Scan reflects a correct analysis of Congress's intent in creat-
ing the notice requirement. In this case, ALS Scan appealed from a
district court ruling that granted RemarQ's motion to dismiss because
ALS Scan failed to comply with the notice requirements set forth in
section 512(c)(3)(A)." 8 RemarQ argued that it remained under the
protection of the DMCA's safe harbor provision because ALS Scan
failed to identify with specificity the nearly 10,000 pictures that were
the subject of unauthorized copying on the "alt.als" and
"alt.binaries.pictures.erotica. als" newsgroups. "' The court held that
ALS Scan complied with the notice requirement where the plaintiff
complied strictly with only two of the six requirements: (3) a list of in-
fringing works contained on the newsgroups and (4) identification of
1 15. Specifically, those artists who are unaffiliated with large licensing conglomerates like
the RIAA.
116. ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 625 (2001).
117. Id.at625.
118. Id. at 621
119. Id. at 620.
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the "works in sufficient detail to enable RemarQ to locate and disable
them." 1
2
Although there is no evidence that ALS Scan provided RemarQ
with Usenet message identification numbers, but instead merely sup-
plied the newsgroup names, the court found this to be sufficient under
section 512(c)(3)(A)(iii) 21  The court's analysis was certainly aligned
with the DMCA in that it was "[i]n the spirit of achieving a balance
between the responsibilities of the service provider and the copyright
owner.''122 Although ALS Scan may be a good example of what sub-
stantial notice was intended to be, it is a poor example of the problem
with the notice requirement because ALS Scan, Inc. was a well-
established and thriving Internet business that had adequate resources
to search for and detect infringement on the Web and Usenet. 123
Because substantially compliant notice under the DMCA ap-
pears to have inconsistent results, creating a significant burden to
copyright holders wishing to reduce the unauthorized sharing of their
works, Part V of this Comment offers a proposed change to the notice
requirement.
B. The Bargain Theory for Immunity from Liability
The Hendrickson holding reflects a strict standard for determin-
ing whether a copyright holder has provided substantially compliant
notice. The court in In re Verizon Internet Services, Inc.124 may not
have come to the same conclusion because it recognized that the Con-
gressional gift of immunity from liability was predicated on the condi-
tion that the ISP or OSP would cooperate to reduce online copyright
infringement.
After Hendrickson was decided, the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia had an opportunity to examine more
closely the subpoena power of the DMCA, and this analysis required
120. Id. at 624.
121. Id. at 624-25.
122. Id. at 625.
123. A pre-DMCA case, Sega Enterprises Limited v. Maphia, 948 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal.
1996), demonstrates this as well. The facts of Sega indicate that copyright holders can easily
identify instances of infringement on the Internet, including bulletin board systems (BBS). Id. at
928. However, a closer look illuminates the special advantages that are unavailable to most copy-
right holders. Unlike the pro se plaintiff in Hendrickson, Sega was a leading manufacturer and
distributor of video game systems and software. Id. at 926. More importantly, Sega did not dis-
cover the infringing activity through any sort of affirmative investigation carried on at its own
expense; instead, the suit was brought only after Sega received an anonymous tip that pirated
versions and unauthorized copies of its software were being distributed on the defendant's BBS.
Id. at 927. It was only after this unexpected tip that Sega then directed one of its employees to
gain access to the defendant's BBS and confirm the unlawful activity. Id. at 926.
124. 240 F.Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003).
2003]
Seattle University Law Review
the court to study the broad purposes of the DMCA, the modern re-
alities of file sharing, and the quid pro quo of ISP immunity from liabil-
ity. The court decided in Verizon that the subpoena authority granted
by the DMCA in 17 U.S.C. section 512(h) affected ISPs that had lim-
ited liability. 2 ' Although this issue did not directly involve the notice
requirement of the DMCA, the court necessarily discussed the pur-
pose behind limited liability for ISPs, and the memorandum opinion is
therefore relevant to this discussion.
From the title of section 512,126 the court correctly inferred that
the DMCA was primarily designed to limit ISP liability stemming
from the acts of individual customers. 2 7 Next, the court correctly in-
terpreted the statute to create a safe harbor from liability for all mone-
tary relief due to direct, vicarious, or contributory copyright infringe-
ment.'28 The greatest contribution of this opinion, however, was
found in a footnote where the court articulated the bargain between
the competing interests of ISP efficiencies and copyright law. After
noting the burden that the subpoena power created for ISPs, the court
said, "But in exchange for complying with subpoenas under subsection
(h), service providers receive liability protection from any copyright in-
fringement-direct or vicarious-by their users. Hence, any addi-
tional burden is offset by that protection, which, of course, is exactly the
contemplation reflected in the structure of the DMCA. '29 In addi-
tion to creating this duality of interests, the DMCA fractionalized the
enforcement role of the copyright property interest; thus, it deserves
brief discussion.
C. The Splintered Enforcement Dilemma
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to examine the theory
of property and the dilemma posed by the DMCA's splintering of the
enforcement role. It is generally accepted that property is an abstract
concept, not existing in the real world. 3 ° Indeed, it is a four-fold rela-
tion involving the owner, the owned, the authority that enforces the
rights involved, and the world, against whom the rights are enforced.
125. Id. at 26.
126. The title of 17 U.S.C. § 512. reads: "Limitations on Liability Relating to Material
Online."
127. Verizon, 240 F.Supp 2d. at 27.
128. Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 20 (1998)).
129. Id. at 34, n.6 (emphasis added).
130. See, e.g., Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied
in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L. J. 16 (1913) (discussing property as being a relation between
legal subjects); see, e.g., Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L. J. 710 (1917).
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This theory of property does not prevent the role of enforcing author-
ity from being shared among multiple entities, nor does it prevent one
of the entities from performing multiple roles. However, the splinter-
ing of the enforcement role negates these rights if sufficient barriers to
detection are erected.
The safe harbor provision and notice requirement of the DMCA
splinters the role of enforcing authority among three entities: copy-
right holders, ISPs, and the courts. Copyright holders must first pro-
vide notice under 17 U.S.C. section 512(c). ISPs then become an en-
forcing authority only when the aforementioned notice requirement is
satisfied. The courts are the final enforcing authority, but only if the
copyright holder brings an action for injunctive relief under 17 U.S.C.
section 502(a). Under this scheme, the role of the ISP or the courts is
conditioned on the successful identification and report by the copy-
right holder. Because their roles are conditional, ISPs have no affirma-
tive duty to monitor their domains until the copyright holder provides
notice of the infringement, as will be discussed below. Neither federal
nor state governments necessarily play any role in actively searching
for copyright infringement, but the law provides statutory remedies to
the copyright holder in the event that infringement is specifically de-
tected.' 3 ' Thus, although three entities may each play a role in enforc-
ing copyright, the responsibilities are not shared. The initial enforcing
authority is the copyright holder, because he must first detect the in-
fringement. Although unauthorized file sharing continues to be a ma-
jor aspect of Internet use, 132 the DMCA places the burden fully on in-
dividual rights holders or their patron organizations to discover any
and all infringing activities. Since the individual copyright holder is
an ineffective enforcing authority, one of two theoretical outcomes
emerges. Either Internet users at large become the initial enforcing
authority by informing copyright holders of infringement on the
Internet, or copyright protection of digital works is destroyed because
there is no adequate enforcing authority to detect infringement. The
history of shareware demonstrates that the latter is likely true.
Some may argue that Internet users at large are a capable enforc-
ing authority for copyright because users receive a direct benefit from
the public release of creative works, and that they will be willing to
131. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1998).
132. Software & Info. Indus. Ass'n, Doesn't Everybody Do It? Internet Piracy Attitudes and
Behaviors, (Fall 2001), at http://www.siia.net/divisions/content/pubs/kmpg.pdf (last visited
June 19, 2003) (stating that "48% of those surveyed believed that everyone who uses the Internet
violates copyright laws at some point; 41% believed that stricter copyright regulations should be
promulgated").
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consistently inform ISPs of copyright infringement.133 This theory has
not proven true. The change in protection schemes for shareware
software demonstrates this well. Shareware is a system of property
where the creator/owner of a piece of software, upon its release, im-
mediately creates a conditional right for anyone to use the software
temporarily.'34  Although the extent of this right varies among soft-
ware engineers, many allow some perpetual, though often increasingly
limited, use without paying any fees. 3 The system of shareware is
premised on the theory that those who continue to use the software
will eventually pay a predetermined fee (or sometimes whatever the
user feels the software is worth).'36 This phenomenon surfaced in the
early 1990s, and most of the payment schemes were either optional or
encouraged by guilt-producing pop-up windows that would appear af-
ter a period of use.'37 Unfortunately, the honor system failed to get
the kind of financial results that shareware authors hoped, and manda-
tory registration enveloped the industry with online services,'38 crip-
pling schemes,'39 and copy protection. As the shareware example
demonstrates, the diligence of Internet users appears to be an inade-
quate enforcing authority if copyright holders are to derive monetary
rewards. Therefore, the individual copyright holder, not the Internet
community at large, must guard his copyright alone. Having dis-
cussed the theoretical justifications for copyright, the practical motiva-
tions for the DMCA, and the enforcement dilemma for individual
copyright holders, this Comment offers a Proposal to level the balance
between the competing interests of low burdens and freedom from vi-
133. The DMCA does not necessarily support such a system because notice must substan-
tially include the "physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to act on behalf of the
owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed." 17 U.S.C. § 512 (c)(3)(A)(i) (emphasis
added). Surely, this would not include good Samaritan Internet users.
134. What is Shareware?, at http://www.semicolon.com/Shareware.html (last visited Feb.
10, 2002) (stating that, "with shareware, you actually use the software before you pay a cent").
135. Id.
136. Id. (stating that users "decide whether you want to keep the software. If you decide to
keep it, you must pay for it-on your honor! But if you decide not to keep it, just delete it from
your system and pay nothing.").
137. Successful Shareware, available at http://www.semicolon.com/ShareSuccess
/Shareware5.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2002). "'Nagware' is software that keeps reminding you
to pay up. Typically all it does is nag. It doesn't deny any functionality to unpaid users, it just
tries to annoy them into paying. After paying, the user is given some way to stop the nagging."
138. For example, Kagi Software is one such popular service, at http://www.kagi.com.
139. Successful Shareware, supra note 137 ("'[C]rippleware': the program runs in semi-
functional demo mode until the user pays up. He is then given a password of some kind that
unlocks the product's full functionality. Or he may be sent a fully-functional version on disk or
by e-mail, or be given access to an ftp site where the fully-functional version can be
downloaded-but the basic idea is that the product is crippled until the user pays.").
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carious liability for ISPs and workable copyright enforcement for indi-
vidual copyright holders.
V. PROPOSAL
In order to effectively safeguard the rights of individual copy-
right holders, this Comment proposes a supplement to the DMCA's
notice requirement. ISPs, OSPs, and individual copyright holders
should be viewed as having different, but equally important, roles in
reducing the crime of copyright infringement in the Internet
neighborhood. Although this Proposal is designed for digital audio
copyrights, it may apply to other forms of content as well. Instead of
interest-group lobbying, 4 ' the legislative process, working within the
normative framework of copyright law,' should have taken into con-
sideration all of the stakeholders: Internet users, large industry asso-
ciations and licensing collectives, ISPs, GSPs, software developers, and
independent copyright holders. Although the DMCA apparently was
not created by such a process, 42 this Proposal assumes that all of these
stakeholder interests should be represented and balanced appropri-
ately.
For the purposes of this Comment, discussions of OSPs will fo-
cus on the online services, rather than Internet access.' 43 Since OSPs
have greater control over both the user experience and the content,
they are often in a better position to know exactly what their capabili-
ties are and who comprises their user base) 44 Most importantly, OSPs
140. LITMAN, supra note 13, at 62.
Perhaps a statute might be enacted over that stakeholder's pitched opposition; but ef-
forts to accomplish that in the past have not succeeded. If the stakeholder will instead
agree to accept the disadvantage in return for an advantage conceded by another
stakeholder, there will be no pitched opposition and the bill will be much more likely
to go through.
Id.
141. Id. at 79-80. "[T]he economic analysis of law... characterizes copyright as a system
of incentives. Today, this is the standard economic model of copyright law, whereby copyright
provides an economic incentive for the creation and distribution of original works of authorship."
Id.
142. Id. at 144-145.
There is no overarching vision of the public interest animating the Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act. None. Instead, what we have is what a variety of different pri-
vate parties were able to extract from each other in the course of an incredibly compli-
cated four-year multiparty negotiation. Unsurprisingly, they paid for that with a lot
of rent-seeking at the expense of new upstart industries and the public at large.
Id.
143. However, as the Internet continues to grow and broadband access becomes more
popular, the distinction between OSPs and ISPs may soon diminish or disappear because ISPs
will probably choose to license increasing amounts of high-bandwidth content.
144. Although the recent news regarding Comcast's Web caching project, discussed earlier,
reveals that the distinction between OSPs and ISPs might not be necessary because ISPs have the
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are generally in managerial control over their domains and they main-
tain usage statistics, because doing so is often vital to their business.14
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, OSPs receive an indirect bene-
fit from copyright infringement because Internet users who are inter-
ested in unauthorized file sharing will patronize OSPs that enable this
activity. ISPs may also receive a similar, albeit more attenuated, bene-
fit.146 Therefore, assisting with the policing of copyrights should be
considered the cost of doing business for OSPs, and the initial steps to
detect copyright infringement should be easier for individual copy-
right holders. Section A proposes a relaxed notice standard, and sec-
tion B discusses the limited OSP duty, a single scan of publicly acces-
sible domains, that the notice will trigger. Section C explains the
responsive dialogue, following the OSP scan, between the OSP and
the individual copyright holder. Following the dialogue, the individ-
ual copyright holder will provide a strict notice to the OSP, discussed
in section D. Section E explains the necessary limitations required in
order to prevent the OSP's duty from becoming unworkable.
A. A "Notice of Belief" Standard for Independent Copyright Holders
Instead of providing a pinpoint location of copyright infringe-
ment on the Internet, independent copyright holders should be able to
make a good faith statement to an OSP'47 of their honest and reason-
able belief that the intrinsic nature of the OSP's service makes the un-
ability to monitor their users (which results in net efficiency and performance benefits rather
than taxing the resources of the ISP).
145. See Hitwise, How We Do It, available at http://www.hitwise.com/ss/howwedoit.html
(last visited May 4, 2003) (stating that "Hitwise monitors Internet Service Provider (ISP) net-
works and other data sources to capture the usage patterns of the ISP's user base. Hitwise ex-
tracts from the partner ISP's networks a list of the websites visited and ranks them according to a
range of industry standard metrics including page requests, visits and average visit length. Hit-
wise also extracts Click-Stream data analysing the movements of visitors between sites to provide
subscribers with information on traffic to and from competitive sites.").
146. If some ISPs offer access to ports and services that facilitate or encourage the illegal
sharing of files, this feature could be appealing enough that some users would make their ISP
choices based on it alone.
147. Arguably, this portion of the Proposal could also apply to companies like Kazaa, an
OSP that offers a network service in the form of software that enables a peer-to-peer file sharing
capability. In addition, it could apply to ISPs because they have the ability to limit (and, at least
in theory, track) the access through a specific port number. Port numbers, a subset of an Inter-
net Protocol address, have been analogized to telephone extensions:
A network port number functions similarly to a telephone extension. Taken together
with a network address, a port number identifies both a computer and also a "chan-
nel" within that computer where network communication will take place. Just as dif-
ferent organizations may use the same extension numbers "inside" their primary
phone number, different computers use the same set of port numbers.
Computer Networking, What IsA Port Number?, available at http://compnetworking.about.com
/library/tips/blfaq012.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2003).
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authorized copying of their work more likely. 4 ' In addition, the copy-
right holder could provide a copy of each digital work and a keyword
list to help the OSP locate instances of infringement. For some artists,
the keyword list could merely be the artist's name and the title of the
work. For others, more descriptive keywords might be necessary. Al-
though most OSPs would likely have the necessary server space to
temporarily store the copies submitted by the copyright holder, such
storage (especially over a long-term period) would be unnecessary, be-
cause the purpose of the copy would be to help the OSP perform a
single scan of its publicly accessible domains (as contrasted from any
sort of on-going duty to continually scan for that work).' 49 The OSP
could discard the copy after performing the scan."' Once the OSP re-
ceives this information, the OSP would have a limited duty to perform
a single scan of only those domains or ports that are free and open to
the public.
Changing this aspect of the notice requirement would create a
more efficient search process, analogous to most methods of searching.
When an Internet user performs a search on an Internet search engine,
she enters a series of terms that will result in the most accurate return
of links. However, given the vast number of Web pages and services
on the Internet, she will likely err on the side of receiving too many re-
turn links in order to minimize the risk of excluding a good link. This
is a good strategy for finding an online resource, but the notice re-
quirement eschews a wide-to-narrow scheme, requiring a single pin-
point location of infringement in the notice that a copyright holder
must give to an ISP. Although the current structure of the notice re-
quirement reflects a policy choice of placing the total burden on the
copyright holder as the primary beneficiary of the right, it is likely
predicated on the following assumptions: (1) there are adequate search
tools available to copyright holders to detect infringement; (2) anti-
circumvention technology will adequately prevent or reduce unauthor-
ized file sharing; (3) the location of infringement will always be static
or last long enough to send compliant notice; and (4) the copyright
holder will be able to communicate that location (either in the form of
an IP address or whatever proprietary information the OSP uses) ade-
148. Note that this alteration of the notice requirement should not remove the ISP from the
protection of any applicable safe harbor provisions. Given the nature of the later proposed error
correction between ISP and the individual copyright holder, any knowledge of infringement
should not be considered evidence of actual or constructive knowledge of infringement. If it
were otherwise, the ISP or OSP would be creating a basis for its own liability.
149. Further, this aspect of the Proposal is likely to be no more cumbersome than the proc-
esses involving ISP and subpoenas to identify infringers in 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(5).
150. Although the OSP would certainly want to maintain records of the interaction for its
own records, keeping the actual copy should not be necessary.
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quately to the ISP in a clear and timely manner. These are not neces-
sarily safe assumptions to make.
As previously stated, Web search engines are generally restricted
to searching via HTTP, with some exceptions." 1 This means that
FTP searches and dynamic HTTP services 12 will not be searchable
by Internet users; therefore, the first assumption fails. Further, P2P
networks exist separate from the Internet, and their popularity indi-
cates that more piracy is taking place here, rather than on the Web. In
addition, anti-circumvention methods frequently found themselves
cracked open by diligent hackers who distribute the keys on the Inter-
net anonymously.'53 Therefore, anti-circumvention methods may
supplement, but not supplant, a copyright holder's plan to substan-
tially reduce unauthorized file sharing on the Internet. The third as-
sumption fails because it does not take into account the prominence of
dynamic Internet Protocol addresses'54 or firewalls. Finally, as the
earlier discussion of Hendrickson illustrates, proprietary locator infor-
mation, such as eBay auction numbers, can prove to be a stumbling
151. Even MP3.Lycos.com is confined to searches via HTTP, although Internet users may
shares files directly from their hard drives via HTTP. FTP shares will also appear in search re-
sults. See MP3.Lycos.com, available at http://mp3.ycos.com (last visited Feb. 16, 2002).
152. That is, services that change based on input from the administrator or other users and
whose Web address is altered periodically.
153. Michelle Delio, The Key to Encryption, available at http://www.wired.com/
news/ebiz/0,1272,44740,FF.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2002); Michelle Delio, Hackers Win Se-
curity Challenge, available at http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,43234,00.html
(last visited Feb. 17, 2002); Paul Boutin, Philips Burning on Protection, available at
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,50101,00.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2002).
If such a law were passed, it's unlikely the proposed standard would be as simple as
adding errors to the aging Red Book format. "My understanding of the current pro-
tection schemes is they're very easy to defeat," Doris says. "If there are millions of
CDs out there, there'll be lots of code posted to the Net-whether it's legal or not."
Id. In May 2002, Sony attempted to roll out a new form of copy protection for compact discs
that would prevent a user from being able to copy the audio tracks onto a computer, but this
method was easily circumvented: "After an initial attempt to play the disc on a PC resulted in
failure, the edge of the shiny side of the disc was blackened out with a felt tip marker. The sec-
ond attempt with the marked-up CD played and copied to the hard drive without a hitch."
Wired News, CD Crack: Magic Marker Indeed, available at http://www.wired.com/news
/technology/0,1282,52665,00.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2003). Not only was the copy protection
scheme easy to defeat, but it reportedly damaged Macintosh computers, causing them to crash.
Id.
154. IPInfo, available at http://www.lawrencegoetz.com/programs/ipinfo/ (last visited
Feb. 17, 2002).
A little bit about your IP address (Internet Protocol address). When you connect to
the internet, either via your internet service provider (AOL, Prodigy, etc.), or your of-
fice LAN connection, you are assigned an IP address. This address identifies your
computer from the other computers on the internet. Your IP address can be either
static, meaning it never changes, or dynamic, meaning each time you dial-in or login
you are assigned a new address for that session.
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block to efficiently providing notice to an OSP."' s Without being able
to rely on these assumptions, the apparent efficacy of the DMCA's
notice requirement breaks down, at least for independent copyright
holders. To counter this failure, the proposed notice of belief is a co-
operative search process that allows for better feedback and error cor-
rection. By providing copies and filenames of works suspected to be
the subject of unauthorized copying, the copyright holder is able to
control the "search terms" of the detection process, and the OSP ap-
propriately functions as the engine because it is in a better position to
know its domain and run a reasonable scan.
B. A Reasonable Scan by OSPs
Having received the filename, a copy of the digital work, and a
keyword list, the notified OSP would be required to run a scan of only
those publicly accessible domains"5 6 or IP addresses, comparing the in-
formation to those files being served. This could be accomplished in a
number of different ways, depending on the nature and size of their
service. Similarly, the need to run multiple scans would likely depend
on the size of the OSP's domain. For instance, in the event that the
OSP incorporated multiple protocols like FTP, HTTP, and Gnutella,
then a separate scan across each protocol might be necessary. If the
OSP did not already monitor usage statistics, server backups, and file
transfers, a number of technologies already exist to fulfill this func-
tion."7 Indeed, technology similar to that discussed in Napster could
be reformed to search for unauthorized copies." 8 In addition, royalty
management software could be leveraged here. However, the use of
such software would not create a guarantee against unauthorized file
sharing, and copyright holders would still require the assistance of the
DMCA in order to reduce copyright infringement on the Internet.
Although one might argue that the absence of such software in great
quantity is evidence of its inability to function in the modern Internet,
such an argument rings hollow considering that there are no legal or
economic incentives for this software to be created. There is no de-
155. Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1090-92.
156. The word "domain" does not refer to the geographic reach of the services; after all,
online services are, by their very nature, global. Instead, this refers to the range of services pro-
vided and the Internet protocols used by those services.
157. For example, see http://www.copyrightnet.com. This website provides digital rights
management and tracking software.
158. JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 25 (2001). "The Internet sometimes gets
characterizes as a giant copying machine that facilitates widespread and undetectable copyright
infringement. That's about 50 percent hype-the Internet facilitates widespread copying, but it
also facilitates detection of copying." Id.
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mand for it currently, because no service provider has any legal obliga-
tion to buy and use it. Given the numerous types of searching tools
available to OSPs, this single scan requirement could fairly, efficiently,
and appropriately balance the burdens of detecting copyright in-
fringement between copyright holders and OSPs.
C. A Responsive Dialogue
Continuing the spirit of neighbor-like cooperation between copy-
right holders and OSPs, a responsive dialog would allow for error cor-
rection presently absent from the notice requirement of the DMCA.
After performing a scan using reasonable efforts to detect the com-
plained of works, the OSP would submit a list of hits, including Inter-
net Protocol numbers" 9 or an equivalent 6 ° back to the copyright
holder, who would then visit these pinpointed locations and confirm
whether the discovered material was infringing or not."' The copy-
right holder would notify the OSP which of the files were matches,
and the OSP would not take additional action until it received confir-
mation from the copyright holder. 6 ' In the alternative, if the found
files matched the copyright holder's submission perfectly, then the
OSP could initiate the takedown procedure on its own or send identi-
fying user information, as described in the DMCA.'63 This Proposal
does not change the safe harbor protection offered by the DMCA to
ISPs, and the proposed OSP sub-category would retain the same pro-
tection.164 Although this step would reduce the speed of responding to
copyright infringement, it would perform the important function of
reducing potentially mistaken takedowns.
159. Internet Protocol numbers are Internet addresses that would enable an examination of
the content being served to the world.
160. In order for the individual copyright holder to view and verify the allegedly infringing
material.
161. This aspect of the Proposal would not affect 17 U.S.C. § 512(h), because the informa-
tion given to the copyright holder here is not an identification of the infringer but rather the in-
fringement itself.
162. However, if the OSP otherwise had knowledge of infringement, then it would be re-
quired to perform a take-down.
163. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c). ISPs are immune from liability resulting from a take down of le-
gally owned material if the ISP returns the material within ten days of receiving notice that such
material was owned by the user.
164. Since this Comment does not propose a change to the safe harbor protection itself,
OSPs would remain immune from the liability for the unknown activities of users, as well as
from wrongful takedowns.
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D. A Notice of Infringement
If the copyright holder determined that the presence of the work
was infringing, the copyright holder would then submit formally com-
pliant notice 6 ' to the OSP, and the OSP would initiate the takedown
procedure 166 described in the DMCA. The copyright holder could
easily provide formal notice in light of the information shared between
the copyright holder and the OSP. The factors would not need to be
changed from those enumerated in 17 U.S.C. section 512 (c).
E. Limitations
Certainly, this Proposal poses potential for abuse by large organi-
zations that own the copyrights in thousands of works. In a flurry of
correspondence, an organization like the RIAA could flood a small
OSP with "Notices of Belief' and the OSP might not be able to re-
spond adequately. Therefore, the proposed mechanism should be
limited to individual copyright holders. The existing notice require-
ment would remain to serve organizations or associations of copyright
holders.
In addition, this Proposal should not be understood to create an
affirmative duty on the part of OSPs to clear their domains of copy-
right infringement. Nor should it be construed as an opportunity for
copyright holders to be free of the burden to locate infringement, be-
cause the proposed system requires that both OSPs and copyright
holders work together to reduce unauthorized file sharing: copyright
holders must submit the initial search terms, OSPs must perform a
single scan, and copyright holders must then confirm the infringe-
ment. Therefore, the Proposal would not result in an unworkable
amount of submissions.
In addition, OSPs must not be saddled with an ongoing duty to
continually scan their publicly accessible domains for the complained
of files. After all, to do so would convert this Proposal from a coop-
erative framework to a singular affirmative duty carried by OSPs. Al-
though this problem might be alternatively solved by a reduction in
the duration of exclusive rights under copyright for music, such a pro-
posal is outside the scope of this Comment.'67 Absent such a change
165. Because of the lowered level of involvement on the part of the copyright holder, the
"substantially compliant" standard could be raised-that the copyright holder's notice comply
strictly with each factor.
166. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C).
167. For a captivating discussion of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, see J.
Michael Keyes, Whatever Happens to Works Deferred?: Reflections on the Ill-Given Deferments of
the Copyright Term Extension Act, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 97 (2002).
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in copyright protection, this Proposal would need to include a provi-
sion at which time the OSP would wash its hands of the duty to scan
and then dispose of the digital copies submitted by the copyright
holder.
VI. COOPERATION: A NEIGHBORHOOD NORM FOR THE
INTERNET
A. Neighborhood Watch
As neighbors on the information superhighway, individual copy-
right holders and ISPs each have a stake in the health of the Internet
and in the variety of its content. Although some copyright owners
have pursued claims against individual users for copyright infringe-
ment,16 such persons represent a distinct minority because such pur-
suit, to say nothing of the cost of litigation, is expensive and will likely
reduce their popularity with patrons.169 Professor Ginsburg suggested
that "authors and copyright owners may be able to work with com-
mercial online services to control the gate between the author and the
public."17  However, this statement was made before the advent of
Napster, Kazaa, and similar services; as stated earlier, files can now be
globally shared via the World Wide Web without any need to negoti-
ate through the contractual access schemes created by an OSP.'7 '
Professor Ginsburg also suggested that copyright holders could
band together in an artistic rights collective responsible for licensing as
well as policing functions.'72 Although this idea has some merit, such
collectives do not satisfy the needs of all copyright holders because
they require artists to give up control over copy permissions, which
they may be reluctant to do. 7 ' Although cooperation between indi-
vidual copyright holders and ISPs is probably the most efficient com-
promise, some might argue that the government, as a stakeholder,
should play a stronger role.
168. Tussey, supra note 1, at 1133.
169. Ginsburg, supra note 37, at 1488.
170. Id.
171. See Gnutella.com, What is Gnutella?, available at http://www.gnutella.com/news
/4210 (last visited Feb. 6, 2002) ("[The Gnutella client] creates a revamped atmosphere on the
Internet, enabling users to share information like never before. To put it simply, Gnutella puts
the personal interaction back into the Internet. When you run Gnutella software and connect to
the Gnutella Network, you bring with you the information you wanted to make public. And you
choose what information to share. You can choose to share nothing; you can choose to share one
file, a directory, or your entire hard drive.").
172. Ginsburg, supra note 37, at 1489.
173. Id.
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B. The Limited Role of Government: Legislation and the Judicial Process
The role of government in identifying and locating copyright in-
fringement on the Internet should not extend past creating law with
legislation and enforcing that law through the judicial system. The
creation of an administrative agency to detect copyright infringement
on the Internet would likely be impractical. Because of the distributed
nature of the Internet and the diverging, even proprietary, quality of
online services, any active regulation of the Internet requires more
than a single entity. 74 The time involved in learning the systems and
networks of every OSP whose service increased the likelihood of copy-
right infringement would be an insurmountable cost, precluding any
meaningful regulation and enforcement. Further, there would un-
doubtedly be a perception that privacy rights would be implicated by
the nature of the government's presence. In reality, however, there
would be no privacy violation because the Proposal limits scans to
publicly available domains or publicly available user information.
Internet users could guarantee that their personal files would not so
much as be glanced at by an OSP if the user was able to password-
protect directory access (a common feature on many Internet hard
drive services). Scanning domains should be the responsibility of
OSPs, not the government, and not because they can perform the
scans, but because some of them are doing so currently.
Comcast, an ISP, recently made headlines for an activity that was
previously believed to be achievable only by the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation's "Echelon/Carnivore"' 75 technology: tracking and cata-
loging Web usage.'76 Comcast accomplished what was previously
thought to be an impossible challenge to ISPs in order to save money
and improve the performance of its cable Internet service.'77 In its
caching system, Comcast recorded the Internet Protocol address of its
subscribers, the Internet address of the Web pages requested, and the
actual content of the most popular pages in its automatically activated
proxy servers; America Online (AOL) was reported as using a similar
system to increase performance. 78 While such technology raises sig-
174. Interestingly, the DMCA can be viewed as forward looking in that it created a dis-
tributed means for scanning a distributed network.
175. Declan McCullagh, Senate Ohs FBI Net Spying, available at http://www.wired.com
/news/politics/0, 1283,46852,00.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2002).
176. Stefanie Olsen & Rachel Konrad, Comcast Privacy Move Its Latest Woe, available at
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nificant privacy concerns 79 (indeed, many have commented that the
caching invites the interest of law enforcement officers and civil action
litigants 8 °), Comcast and AOL's newly discovered ability puts to rest
the foolish contention that it was impossible for ISPs to monitor Inter-
net activity. 8' Given the ability of OSPs to scan their domains, it
seems clear that copyright holders should not shoulder the initial bur-
den of detection alone.
C. Support for Independent Copyright Holders
The present burden on copyright holders, especially individuals
not represented by a recording collective, is overwhelming because
they are unable to efficiently find instances of infringement, in part
because there is no guarantee that they are sufficiently familiar with
the mechanics of the Internet. The real problem for copyright holders
qua enforcement agents is that they are likely unable to learn the intri-
cacies of the numerous OSP domains that exist on the Internet. Thus,
they are unable to complete the basic tasks of identifying and locating
infringement. Any regime that exists to further the creative endeavors
of artists should maximize the amount of time artists spend creating so
that society receives a continuous and robust stream of new art.
The problem of P2P technology has been particularly vexing to
the RIAA, and it has attempted to reduce copyright infringement
through litigation8 2 and other means. Wired Magazine recently listed
the following twelve tactics: gluing review compact discs (CDs) inside
portable stereos; sending out promotional analog cassettes (in lieu of
distributing digital CDs); employing digital watermarks on CDs; dis-
179. Stefanie Olsen & Rachel Konrad, ZDNet News, Privacy Fears Stoke Ire Against Com-
cast, available at http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1105-837029.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2002)
("'This information has never been connected to individual subscribers and has been purged
automatically to protect subscriber privacy,' Burke said. 'Beginning immediately, we will stop
storing this individual customer information in order to completely reassure our customers that
the privacy of their information is secure."').
180. Id.
181. Olsen & Konrad, supra note 176.
182. Katie Dean, RIAA Hits Students Where It Hurts, available at http://www.wired
.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,58351,00.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2003).
The Recording Industry Association of America apparently took a page from the
military handbooks of coalition forces in Iraq this week when it attempted to 'shock
and awe' college music pirates by hitting them with hefty lawsuits.
The trade group is suing four students for operating Napster-like file-sharing services
on their campus networks.
Id. Interestingly, the RIAA chose this public action instead of proceeding with the takedown
process set forth in the DMCA. Id. Arguably, this decision implies the inadequacy of a private
DMCA takedown-such private actions are unlikely to shape Internet norms, whereas publi-
cized litigation of college students may have profound effects (one of which may be to diminish
further the RIAA's image).
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tributing bogus audio files, disguised as real songs, on P2P networks;
hiring many people to stand in line on P2P servers so as to prevent
others from accessing the files; placing copy protection on CDs; sell-
ing digital music files at competitive prices online; hosting pre-release
listening parties; allowing those who purchase CDs to access addi-
tional music or video files when their CD is inserted in a computer;
suing the networks or software companies themselves, rather than the
individual users; lobbying Congress for stronger copyright sanctions
or the ability to hack into P2P users' hard drives; and running adver-
tising campaigns, hoping to change Internet norms.
183
Of these numerous tactics, few are practicable for independent
copyright holders because they require substantial financial resources.
For instance, it is unlikely that many independent copyright holders
are able to pay for lobbying efforts of protracted litigation against
software companies like Kazaa. Further, independent musicians are
not likely willing to sacrifice their reputation by engaging in guerilla
copyright protection tactics, since such a maneuver would place their
small fan base at risk.
Recent developments in the digital rights management and
Internet service provider industries indicate that the burden on copy-
right holders increased considerably after the recent American reces-
sion of 2001 and that the challenge of tracking Internet usage is not as
difficult for ISPs and OSPs as it once seemed. Since July 2001, a
number of content protection companies have shut down or laid off
significant portions of their staff.'84 This phenomenon is due not only
to the recession, but can also be attributed to inherent problems in the
technology used to protect digital works. 5 Because safeguarding such
content usually involves completing multiple-step purchases, navigat-
ing through password dialogs, and dealing with proprietary encryption
systems, application of these controls to new markets like electronic
books has created significant roadblocks to adoption.'86 Further, be-
cause of concerns about unauthorized copying, such protections
schemes prevent or hamper the portability of the protected work (and
ease of portability is arguably the most important aspect of a digital
work).'87 The scant remaining players in the digital rights manage-
183. Matt Bai, Hating Hilary, WIRED MAGAZINE, Feb. 2003, at 98.
184. Wade Roush, The Death of Digital Rights Management?, available at http://www.
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ment industry provide few practical assurances to today's digital con-
tent creators.'
8
Although some may argue that cases like ALS Scan demonstrate
the success of the DMCA as it relates to copyright holders' ability to
find infringing use on the Internet, supply adequate notice to the OSP,
and have the material taken down, Hendrickson v. eBay8 9 highlights
the problem inherent in the notice mechanism when the copyright
holder is a person, rather than a large business or licensing collective;
creative individuals that are unaffiliated with a licensing collective do
not likely have the resources to spend hunting down infringement.
While it may seem easy to discover infringing activity on the
Internet, publicly available search engines access only a small percent-
age of the Internet. Indeed, many commercial search engines are
compromised by contracts that predetermine the ordering of results. 90
Many businesses pay money in order to be listed when certain search
terms are entered."' Further, even Web sites that do not pay fees for
search engine placement place metatags in HTML code in order to
appear before others. 9 ' Although such Web sites arguably make it
easier to determine the nature of their service, it nevertheless obscures
search engine results, and more importantly, reduces the control that
copyright holders have in their endeavors to end infringement of their
works on the Internet. Not only do search engines fail to scan all
pages on the Web, 19 but existing search engines are often limited to
scanning HTTP documents, which do not include FTP servers,
Gnutella servers, or the Kazaa network.) 9' Usenet newsgroups, FTP
servers, and publicly available Internet hard drives are all unavailable
to search engines without software that is specifically created to scan
those domains. Thus, copyright holders who wish to prevent unau-
thorized copying and distribution of their works on the Internet must
spend considerable amounts of time manually paging through publicly
available domains on the Internet to quell the flow of infringement.
Cooperation, therefore, is an imperative.
188. Id.
189. 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
190. Rik Fairlie, Search Engines Rank Revenue Over Relevance, available at http://
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D. The Hybridized Enforcing Authority:
Independent Copyright Holders and OSPs
In Napster, the court made the following statement:
Napster may be vicariously liable when it fails to affirmatively
use its ability to patrol its system and preclude access to poten-
tially infringing files listed in its search index. Napster has both
the ability to use its search function to identify infringing musi-
cal recordings and the right to bar participation of users who en-
gage in the transmission of infringing files. 9 '
Although it is unclear what authority the court was referencing in
this statement, it clearly expresses the sentiment that OSPs have a re-
sponsibility to use their best efforts as citizens of a lawful Internet.
OSPs, however, cannot read the minds of copyright holders, and as
such, it is impossible for an OSP to know which files are shared with
the permission of the copyright holder and which are infringing uses
by an end user. Therefore, because OSPs are not in the best position
to identify instances of infringement, they cannot shoulder the burden
of an affirmative duty to police their domains. However, OSPs should
share in the responsibility for enforcing copyright law because they
derive a substantial benefit, albeit indirect, from the infringing activity
of their users, as is illustrated in the example below.
If an OSP derives a benefit from unauthorized file sharing, then,
arguably, the OSP should bear part of the cost to the copyright
holder." Imagine that there is a business called FullOnFiles.com that
provides an Internet hard drive service allowing users to upload and
share diverse types of data. If FullOnFiles.com becomes a well-
known service, at least part of that reputation will be built on the ac-
tual services it offers, distinguished from its overt marketing.'97 At
least some of the users of FullOnFiles.com will share files in deroga-
tion of copyright owners' exclusive rights, and this use, like others,
could quickly become part of the FullOnFiles.com reputation. If this
195. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001).
196. CNN.com, Anti-Smoking Groups Urge Cigarette Tax Hikes, available at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/02/26/cigarette.tax.increase/index.html (last visited Mar. 5,
2002). Tobacco taxes exist not only to reduce the number of cigarettes sold, but they also func-
tion, at least in theory, to defray the societal cost from tobacco-related illnesses. A similar
scheme, closer to copyright issues, exists in some countries regarding the sale of blank recordable
compact discs (CD-R). For each CD-R sold, a small percentage of the sale goes to recording
industry concerns. Although this is not necessarily done to discourage the consumption of CD-
Rs, the amount collected by the recording industry theoretically compensates those artists whose
music is copied.
197. For instance, if FullOnFiles.com allows a capability that allows users to browse each
other's Internet hard drives, then this capability would likely be a significant incentive for mem-
bers to use FullOnFiles.com rather than other services which do not provide this.
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kind of infringing use was popular, then FullOnFiles.com would de-
rive a benefit by virtue of the infringing activity. If this benefit is sub-
stantial enough to affect in any way the nature of FullOnFiles.com's
business or marketing plans, then it should carry some of the respon-
sibility for routing out infringement on the Internet. In contrast, such
a benefit is not realized by an ISP that provides mere Internet access
because its reputation will be built on price points, bandwidth, and re-
liability.
OSPs whose business is a lawful enterprise would not be unduly
burdened by this Proposal, because many such businesses already pos-
sess the necessary tools to run ad hoc scans of their domains. 9 8 Since
the Proposal does not create an ongoing duty to monitor networks, few
additional resources would be necessary. After all, OSPs are already
required by the DMCA to respond to notification of infringement by
copyright owners,'99 and this Proposal would not significantly change
the nature of this required resource.
Copyright owners are in the best position to know whether their
work is being shared, precisely because such sharing is usually at the
copyright owner's discretion, and also because digital works do not
necessarily include embedded copyright information. However, as
discussed above, copyright owners are not often learned in the intrica-
cies of every OSP whose service may be apt to create or encourage in-
stances of infringement of their work by end users. Thus, their abili-
ties, the copyright owner's ability to identify and the OSP's ability to
locate, should be combined to maintain a responsible and lawful
Internet.
E. Allocating Burdens, Considering Privacy, and Clarifying Fair Use
To be sure, copyright "was designed to be full of holes, '200 plac-
ing a greater importance on the sharing of works than on the incen-
tives for creators, but the current iteration of the DMCA, as it relates
to the reduction of copyright infringement on the Internet, is woefully
inadequate because it fails to establish a meaningful enforcing author-
ity. While the current construction reflects a general policy considera-
tion that the Internet should be unfettered by restrictions, the imple-
mentation of this policy was short-sighted. Copyright holders are
arguably in the best position to identify the infringement of their
198. Olsen & Konrad, supra note 176.
199. Presently, in order to comply with the DMCA, ISPs likely need both technology and
personnel who are able to locate files and initiate take-downs; therefore, adopting this Proposal,
widening only the scope of the initial scan, would not likely impact the ability of OSPs to com-
ply.
200. LITMAN, supra note 13, at 79.
[Vol. 26:9791012
2003] The Notice Requirement of the DMCA 1013
rights, but ISPs are in the best position to locate the files because they
control their domains and Internet Protocol addresses more directly.
Some Internet users may balk at the notion that their OSP might
scan their activities, but such privacy concerns fail to recognize the
limited nature of this Proposal. After all, OSPs would only scan pub-
licly available domains. If a user was concerned about such a scan, the
mere use of password protection would take the domain out of the
scope of the OSP scan. Additionally, the relationship between OSP
and user is governed by contract law, providing adequate notice to the
user of the OSP's policy.21
While the doctrine of fair use,2"2 which corrects market failures
that are due to impossibly high transaction costs, is a defense to an in-
fringement action, it does not apply where an individual shares, with-
out authorization, copyright-protected works with the world via the
Internet." 3 Factors to be considered when determining whether a use
201. For example, AT&T Broadband cuts a much wider swath in its subscriber agreement,
below, than does the Proposal:
(g.) Monitoring of Postings and Transmissions. AT&T Broadband shall have no ob-
ligation to monitor postings or transmissions made in connection with the Service.
However, Customer acknowledges and agrees that AT&T Broadband and its agents
shall have the right to monitor any such postings and transmissions, including with-
out limitation e-mail, newsgroups, chat, IP audio and video, and web space content,
from time to time and to disclose them in accordance with Section 4 of this Agree-
ment, and as otherwise required by law or government request. AT&T Broadband
reserves the right to refuse to upload, post, publish, transmit or store any information
or materials, in whole or in part, that, in its sole discretion, is unacceptable, undesir-
able or in violation of this Agreement.
(h.) Eavesdropping. AT&T Broadband's facilities are used by numerous persons or
entities including, without limitation, other subscribers to the Service. As a result,
there is a risk that Customer could be subject to "eavesdropping." This means that
other persons or entities may be able to access and/or monitor Customer's use of the
Service. This risk of eavesdropping exists not only with AT&T Broadband's facili-
ties, but also on the Internet and other services to which access is provided as a part of
the Service. Any sensitive or confidential information posted, stored, transmitted or
disseminated by Customer is done so at Customer's sole risk, and neither AT&T
Broadband nor its affiliates shall have any liability whatsoever for any claims, losses,
actions, damages, suits or proceedings arising out of or otherwise relating to such ac-
tions by Customer. Customer acknowledges that software programs claiming to be
capable of encryption are commercially available. AT&T Broadband makes no repre-
sentation or warranty regarding the effectiveness of such programs.
AT&T Broadband, AT&T Broadband Subscriber Agreement, available at http://help
.broadband.att.com/faq.jsp?contentid=973&lobid=1 (last visited Apr. 6, 2003). See also dis-
cussion, supra Part VI.B.
202. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); see, e.g., Matthew D. Bunker, Eroding Fair Use: The "Trans-
formative" Use Doctrine after Campbell, 7 COMM. L. & POL'Y 1 (2002) (discussing the develop-
ment of the fair use doctrine).
203. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015-17 (9th Cir. 2001).
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is a fair use include the purpose and character of the use,20 4 the nature
of the given work,0 5 the portion of the work used, °6 and the effect of
the use on the value of the work or the potential market for the
work.2 7 After the A&M Records v. Napster decision, 28 however, the
free and open public distribution of digital music to the world consti-
tuted infringement of the copyright holder's right to publicly perform
the work, to distribute copies, and to perform the work publicly by
means of a digital audio transmission,2 9 and the court determined that
such use was not fair use. By prohibiting unauthorized file sharing via
the Web, this decision preserves the limited monopoly right granted
by American copyright law, ensures that the Audio Compact Disc
market will remain,210 and safeguards the ability of artists to enter the
digital music delivery market as it develops.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Internet has been described as an information superhigh-
way, a cyberspace, and a global village, but the DMCA fails to sup-
port these metaphors, least of all the global village or neighborhood.
Instead of privatizing copyright enforcement and placing all of its
burdens on the individual copyright holder, the notice requirement
DMCA should be supplemented for independent copyright holders so
as to reflect the Neighborhood Watch model, thereby strengthening
modern copyright norms.
Although the DMCA responded to significant inadequacies of
traditional copyright law in relation to the Internet, it needs revision.
The DMCA's notice requirement appears predicated on unreliable as-
sumptions about the nature of the Internet and, alone, copyright hold-
ers qua initial enforcing authorities are unequipped to meet the chal-
lenge of finding unauthorized file sharing on the Internet. Moreover,
204. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). This includes an inquiry as to whether the use is commercial




208. 239 F.3d at 1011-13 (interestingly, this decision marks the first holding that specifi-
cally restricts the Internet-only action of global file sharing of copyrighted works as illegal-other
holdings have had real world equivalents).
209. Id. at 1013-16.
210. Id. at 1018, 1026 (affirming the finding of the lower court that "both the market for
audio CDs and market for online distribution are adversely affected by Napster's service... the
court did not abuse its discretion when it found that, overall, Napster has an adverse impact on
the audio CD and digital download markets."; also holding that destruction of Napster, Inc. due
to an injunction was speculative "compared to the statistical evidence of massive, unauthorized
downloading and uploading of plaintiffs' copyrighted works-as many as 10,000 files per second
by defendant's own admission.").
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copyright law was never intended to transform artists into police. Al-
though allocating the totality of the burden to copyright holders may
be satisfying in the abstract, it fails in reality. Unfortunately, the gov-
ernment is not likely able to effectively police the Internet for copy-
right infringement. Instead, OSPs and copyright holders should be
encouraged by a revision to the notice requirement of the DMCA to
work together to significantly reduce infringement on the Internet.
Copyright holders are in the best position to identify their works, and
OSPs are in the best position to locate them once they receive ade-
quate information from copyright holders. Indeed, this is an efficient,
effective, and cooperative way to reinforce copyright norms on the
P2P- and Web-based neighborhoods of the Internet.
